Strategies and games :theory and practice
- 作者: Dutta, Prajit K.
- 出版: Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press ©1999.
- 稽核項: 1 online resource (xxx, 476 pages) :illustrations.
- 標題: Speltheorie. , EconomicsTheory. , Economics. , Spieltheorie , Equilibrium (Economics) , Gleichgewichtsmodell , Équilibre (Économie politique) , Economisch evenwicht. , Electronic books. , Équilibre (Économie politique). , BUSINESS & ECONOMICS Economics -- Theory. , Equilíbrio econômico. , Jeux, Théorie des. , Game Theory , Teoria dos jogos. , Théorie des jeux. , Strategisches Management , Game theory. , BUSINESS & ECONOMICS
- ISBN: 0262041693 , 9780262041690
- ISBN: 0262041693 , 9780262041690
- 試查全文@TNUA:
- 附註: Includes bibliographical references and index. Preface; A Reader's Guide; Part One -- Introduction; Chapter 1 -- A First Look at the Applications; Chapter 2 -- A First Look at the Theory; Part Two -- Strategic Form Games: Theory and Practice; Chapter 3 -- Strategic Form Games and Dominant Strategies; Chapter 4 -- Dominance Solvability; Chapter 5 -- Nash Equilibrium; Chapter 6 -- An Application: Cournot Duopoly; Chapter 7 -- An Application: The Commons Problem; Chapter 8 -- Mixed Strategies; Chapter 9 -- Two Applications: Natural Monopoly and Bankruptcy Law; Chapter 10 -- Zero-Sum Games. Part Three -- Extensive Form Games: Theory and ApplicationsChapter 11 -- Extensive Form Games and Backward Induction; Chapter 12 -- An Application: Research and Development; Chapter 13 -- Subgame Perfect Equilibrium; Chapter 14 -- Finitely Repeated Games; Chapter 15 -- Infinitely Repeated Games; Chapter 16 -- An Application: Competition and Collusion in the NASDAQ Stock Market; Chapter 17 -- An Application: OPEC; Chapter 18 -- Dynamic Games with an Application to the Commons Problem; Part Four -- Asymmetric Information Games: Theory and Applications; Chapter 19 -- Moral Hazard and Incentives Theory. Chapter 20 -- Games with Incomplete InformationChapter 21 -- An Application: Incomplete Information in a Cournot Duopoly; Chapter 22 -- Mechanism Design, the Revelation Principle, and Sales to an Unknown Buyer; Chapter 23 -- An Application: Auctions; Chapter 24 -- Signaling Games and the Lemons Problem ; Part Five -- Foundations; Chapter 25 -- Calculus and Optimization; Chapter 26 -- Probability and Expectation; Chapter 27 -- Utility and Expected Utility; Chapter 28 -- Existence of Nash Equilibria; Index.
- 摘要: Game theory has become increasingly popular among undergraduate aswell as business school students. This text is the first to provideboth a complete theoretical treatment of the subject and a variety ofreal-world applications, primarily in economics, but also in business, political science, and the law.
- 電子資源: https://dbs.tnua.edu.tw/login?url=https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&AN=9250
- 系統號: 005283431
- 資料類型: 電子書
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Game theory has become increasingly popular among undergraduate aswell as business school students. This text is the first to provideboth a complete theoretical treatment of the subject and a variety ofreal-world applications, primarily in economics, but also in business,political science, and the law. Game theory has become increasingly popular among undergraduate as well as business school students. This text is the first to provide both a complete theoretical treatment of the subject and a variety of real-world applications, primarily in economics, but also in business, political science, and the law. Strategies and Games grew out of Prajit Dutta's experience teaching a course in game theory over the last six years at Columbia University.The book is divided into three parts: Strategic Form Games and Their Applications, Extensive Form Games and Their Applications, and Asymmetric Information Games and Their Applications. The theoretical topics include dominance solutions, Nash equilibrium, backward induction, subgame perfect equilibrium, repeated games, dynamic games, Bayes-Nash equilibrium, mechanism design, auction theory, and signaling. An appendix presents a thorough discussion of single-agent decision theory, as well as the optimization and probability theory required for the course.Every chapter that introduces a new theoretical concept opens with examples and ends with a case study. Case studies include Global Warming and the Internet, Poison Pills, Treasury Bill Auctions, and Final Jeopardy. Each part of the book also contains several chapter-length applications including Bankruptcy Law, the NASDAQ market, OPEC, and the Commons problem. This is also the first text to provide a detailed analysis of dynamic strategic interaction.
來源: Google Book
來源: Google Book
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