附註:Includes bibliographical references (pages 119-124) and index.
S. The Decline of American Hegemony and the Rise of Global Competition. The Rise and Erosion of American Technological Leadership. Globalization during the 1980s: The Onset of Technoglobalism -- 2. National Innovation Systems, Industrial Policies, and the Rise of Technonationalism. Technical Advance and "Market Failure" National Innovation Systems. National Policies during the 1980s: Bucking the Tide of Internationalism. High-Technology Fetishism and Technonationalism -- 3. High-Tech Conflict in the 1980s. The Subsidies Dispute: Airbus. Disputes over Government Procurement and Regulation of Standards. Investment-Related Trade Measures. Autos and the Keiretsu. Voluntary Import Expansion. Structural Impediments and System Friction -- 4. Coping with System Friction: Deeper Integration and Other Means. Some Implications of Technoglobalism. Deeper Integration: Harmonization and Other Approaches to Reduce System Friction. International Spillovers and Reciprocity Issues.
摘要:Techno-Nationalism and Techno-Globalism: Conflict and Cooperation is a broad-ranging study of the technological competitiveness of nations. It examines the origins of trade and public policy conflict in the United States, Japan, France, and Germany; the friction between countries caused by shifts in competitiveness; the role of trade policy in both causing and attempting to resolve these frictions; and the scope for new initiatives aimed at strengthening international cooperation. The authors argue that the margin of the U.S. technology lead has been narrowing since the 1960s, caused in part by the rise of Japanese industry in a variety of high-tech industries, and in part by the rapid circulation of information and diffusion of technology. They show how changes in technical competitiveness have created new sources of economic conflict between nations. , Because governments increasingly believe that long-term wealth creation depends on superior technical skills, they are inclined to provide direct or indirect assistance to potential technological winners. This raises the risk of trade and subsidy wars. , . Technology now spreads quickly, reducing the time it used to take for competitors to catch up. The authors explain that to create adequate return on the considerable investment that high tech requires, firms must have ready access to foreign markets through trade and through direct investment. In addition to formal restrictions on trade and investment, structural impediments have become a bigger problem. These arise from policy sanctioned by exclusionary links among and between producers, distributors, and financiers.
