附註:Includes bibliographical references (pages 169-172) and index.
1. The Varieties of Realism; 2. Realism and the Success of Science; 3. Realism and Scientific Practice; 4. Realism and Theoretical Unification; 5. Realism and Underdetermination I: Does Every Theory Have Empirically Equivalent Rivals?; 6. Realism and Underdetermination II: Does Empirical Equivalence Entail Underdetermination?; 7. The Vulnerability Criterion of Belief; 8. The Belief-Acceptance Distinction; 9. The Theory-Observation Distinction I: Fodor's Distinction; 10. The Theory-Observation Distinction II: Van Fraassen's Distinction.
摘要:This book offers a clear analysis of the standard arguments for and against scientific realism (i.e., the position that the theoretical entities postulated by science exist). Kukla focuses on what Jarrett Leplin calls minimal epistemic realism, which merely claims that it is not impossible to have good reasons for believing that theoretical entities exist (most scientific realists want to claim more than this). In surveying claims on both sides of the debate, Kukla organizes them in ways that expose unnoticed connections, permitting recognition of generic failings and anticipation of generic responses. Time and again he reveals influential arguments to be special cases of broader patterns of inference which are mistaken or question-begging in some important way. At the same time, he finds new ways to reconcile seemingly incompatible positions, or to escape some supposed disastrous implication. And some of the unoccupied positions that Kukla discovers and develops constitute positive contributions with the potential to influence further debate. Kukla's book is for students and scholars of philosophy of science as well as scientists interested in questions bearing upon the philosophical foundations of their discipline.
