附註:"Bison books"--Page [i].
Originally published: 3rd ed. London : H.M.S.O., 1906. With new introd.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Introduction -- Causes of small wars as affecting their conditions -- The objective in small wars -- Difficulties under which the regular forces labour as regards intelligence -- The influence of the question of supply upon small wars and the extent to which it must govern the plan of operations -- Boldness and vigour the essence of effectively conducting such operations -- Tactics favour the regular Army while strategy favours the enemy : therefore the object is to fight, not to manoeuvre -- To avoid desultory warfare the enemy must be brought to battle, and in such manner as to make his defeat decisive -- Division of force, often necessitated by the circumstances, is less objectionable in these campaigns than in regular warfare -- Lines of communications, their liability to attack, the drain they are upon the army, and the circumstances under which they can be dispensed with -- Guerilla warfare in general -- Tactics of defence -- Pursuits and retreats -- The employment of feints to tempt the enemy into action to conceal designs upon the battlefield -- Surprises, raids and ambuscades -- Squares in action on the march and in bivouac -- Hill warfare -- Bush warfare -- Infantry tactics -- Camel corps -- Artillery tactics -- Machine guns -- The service of security -- Night operations.
摘要:Originally published in 1896, Small Wars is an ambitious attempt to analyze and draw lessons from Western experience in fighting campaigns of imperial conquest. For the historian, Small Wars remains a useful and vital analysis of irregular warfare experiences, ranging from Hoche's suppression of the Vendee revolt during the French Revolution to the British wars against semi-organized armies of Marathas and Sikhs in mid-nineteenth-century India to the Boer War of 1899-1902. The military specialist discovers in Callwell lessons applicable to what today is called "low-intensity conflict." His message is clear, and it is relevant to current debates about conflicts as diverse as those in Bosnia, Somalia, and Vietnam. Technological superiority is an important, but seldom critical, ingredient in the success of low-intensity operations. An ability to adapt to terrain and climate, to match the enemy in mobility and inventiveness, to collect intelligence, and above all the capacity to "seize what the enemy prizes most," will determine success or failure. This reprint adds historical dimensions to the growing literature on unconventional conflict.
