資料來源: Google Book
Computation and cognition :toward a foundation for cognitive science
- 作者: Pylyshyn, Zenon W.,
- 出版: Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press ©1984.
- 稽核項: 1 online resource (xxiii, 292 pages) :illustrations.
- 標題: Kognitive Psychologie , computers. , cognition. , Intelligence artificielle. , SCIENCE , artificial intelligence. , SCIENCE Cognitive Science. , Ordinateurs. , Cognitive science. , Ninshiki , PSYCHOLOGY Cognitive Psychology. , Artificial intelligence , Kognition , Cognitive Psychology. , Jinkozuno , Cognitiewetenschap. , Cognitie. , Theorie , Kognitiver Prozess , Künstliche Intelligenz , Cognition , Computers , Kunstmatige intelligentie. , Electronic books. , Cognition. , PSYCHOLOGY , Artificial intelligence. , Sciences cognitives. , Cognitive Science. , Artificial Intelligence
- ISBN: 026266058X , 9780262660587
- ISBN: 9780262160988 , 0262160986
- 試查全文@TNUA:
- 附註: "A Bradford book." Includes bibliographical references (pages 273-283) and index. The explanatory vocabulary of cognition -- The explanatory role of representations -- The relevance of computation -- The Psychological reality of programs: Strong equivalence -- Constraining functional architeture -- The bridge from physical to symbolic: Transduction introduction -- Functional architecture and analogue processes -- mental imagery and functional architeture -- Epilogue: What is cognitive science the science of.
- 電子資源: https://dbs.tnua.edu.tw/login?url=https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&AN=48588
- 系統號: 005293166
- 資料類型: 電子書
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- 引用網址: 複製連結
The question, "What is Cognitive Science?" is often asked but seldom answered to anyone's satisfaction. Until now, most of the answers have come from the new breed of philosophers of mind. This book, however, is written by a distinguished psychologist and computer scientist who is well-known for his work on the conceptual foundations of cognitive science, and especially for his research on mental imagery, representation, and perception. In Computation and Cognition, Pylyshyn argues that computation must not be viewed as just a convenient metaphor for mental activity, but as a literal empirical hypothesis. Such a view must face a number of serious challenges. For example, it must address the question of "strong equivalents" of processes, and must empirically distinguish between phenomena which reveal what knowledge the organism has, phenomena which reveal properties of the biologically determined "functional architecture" of the mind. The principles and ideas Pylyshyn develops are applied to a number of contentious areas of cognitive science, including theories of vision and mental imagery. In illuminating such timely theoretical problems, he draws on insights from psychology, theoretical computer science, artificial intelligence, and psychology of mind. A Bradford Book
來源: Google Book
來源: Google Book
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