Artless integrity :moral imagination, agency, and stories
- 作者: Babbitt, Susan E.
- 出版: Lanham, Md. : Rowman & Littlefield ©2001.
- 稽核項: 1 online resource (xix, 199 pages).
- 標題: PHILOSOPHY , Imagination (Philosophy) , Ethik , Morale. , ethics (philosophy) , PHILOSOPHY Ethics & Moral Philosophy. , Integrität , Intégrité. , Social. , Electronic books. , Ethics & Moral Philosophy. , Ethics , Integrity. , Ethics. , PHILOSOPHY Social.
- ISBN: 0585379424 , 9780585379425
- ISBN: 0742512134 , 9780742512139 , 0742512126 , 9780742512122
- 試查全文@TNUA:
- 附註: Includes bibliographical references (pages 185-191) and index. Cover; Half title; Title; Copyright; Dedication; Contents; Acknowledgments; Introduction: Moral Imagination and Democracy; 1. Moral Risk and Dark Waters; 2. Self-Respect: What Institutions Have to Do with Expectations; 3. Integrity, Stability, and the Self; 4. Friendship and Solidarity; 5. Artless Integrity and the Power of the Story; 6. "We Must Continue Dreaming": Democracy, Cuba, and the Armed Owl; References; Index; About the Author.
- 摘要: Susan Babbitt dissects a common moral perspective for judging importance which she calls 'moral imagination.' In order to explain ourselves, and to recognize in others, what we often already perceive intuitively to be right or good, we instinctively create a story as a framework. She argues that we intentionally create stories which appear artless or chaotic, something capable of imperfection. This allows the story-maker to eventually deviate if he or she chooses, without a loss of hope, even if that direction and goal may not yet be able to be fully articulated or defended.
- 電子資源: https://dbs.tnua.edu.tw/login?url=https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&AN=60957
- 系統號: 005295570
- 資料類型: 電子書
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- 引用網址: 複製連結
This book considers the nature and exercise of moral imagination in situations in which our ability to act and choose meaningfully is limited by unarticulated expectations. Moral imagination is a cognitive attitude, in which we regard propositions as true. But it also involves orientation. In moral imagination, we regard propositions as true in order to make something else true, and we act and interpret as if it were true. The demand for explanatory unity in such situations - what I call 'explanatory burden' - involves self-constitution, with seeing oneself as a certain sort of person and developing relevant expectations. Whereas it is common to define human well-being in terms of choice and capacities, I suggest that meaningful choice and human capacities are sometimes defined in terms of the actual pursuit and achievement of human well-being. I draw upon examples from literature, film, and historical narrative to suggest that while we think autonomy and agency consist, at least in part, in taking control, we must sometimes be controlled by circumstances and relations in order to occupy an appropriate interpretive perspective for real freedom. I consider the implications of this point for such concepts as respect, friendship and democracy.
來源: Google Book
來源: Google Book
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