附註:Includes bibliographical references (pages 307-314) and indexes.
Introduction -- Groundwork of the Theory -- Power as Influence -- Weighted Voting in the US -- Weighted Voting in the CMEC -- Power as a Prize -- Paradoxes and Postulates -- Taking Abstention Seriously -- Appendix A: Numerical Examples -- Appendix B: Axiomatic Characterizations.
摘要:This book is the first of its kind: a monograph devoted to a systematic critical examination and exposition of the theory of a priori voting power. This important branch of social-choice theory overlaps with game theory and is concerned with the ability of members in bodies that make yes or no decisions by vote to affect the outcome. The book includes, among other topics, a reasoned distinction between two fundamental types of voting power, the authors' discoveries on the paradoxes of voting power, and a novel analysis of decision rules that admit abstention.
