附註:Includes bibliographical references (pages 298-320) and indexes.
History of the concept of economic efficiency -- The foundation: A new measure for economic efficiency -- The nature of economic efficiency -- The nature of inefficiency -- Rights and the relationship of law to efficiency -- The problem of missing values in normative law and economic analysis -- The failure of market failure -- Of distributive justice and economic efficiency: An integrated theory of the common law -- The efficiency of the common law: An economic analysis of dueling, cannibalism, the gold rush, racism, and antitrust law -- A recapitulation.
摘要:In this path-breaking book, Richard Zerbe introduces a new way to think about the concept of economic efficiency that is both consistent with its historical derivation and more useful than concepts currently used. He establishes an expanded version of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency as an axiomatic system that performs the following tasks: the new approach obviates certain technical and ethical criticisms that have been made of economic efficiency; it answers critics of efficiency; it allows an expanded range for efficiency analysis; it establishes the conditions under which economists can reasonably say that some state of the world is inefficient. He then applies the new analysis to a number of hard and fascinating cases, including the economics of duelling, cannibalism and rape. He develops a new theory of common law efficiency and indicates the circumstances under which the common law will be inefficient.
