附註:Includes bibliographical references (pages 309-319) and index.
"He don't care a damn for what the enemy does out of his sight" -- "My means of information are certainly better than ... most" -- "I always try to keep myself posted" -- "You will soon hear if my presentiment is realized" -- "There will be no fight at Pittsburg Landing" -- "With all the vigilance I can bring to bear I cannot determine the objects of the enemy" -- "I have reliable information from the entire interior of the South" -- "What force the enemy have ... I have no means of judging accurately" -- "That gives just the information I wanted" -- "Is it not certain that early has returned?" -- "He could not send off any large body without my knowing it" -- "The difference in war is full twenty five per cent."
摘要:William B. Feis offers us the first scholarly examination of the use of military intelligence under Ulysses S. Grant's command during the Civil War. Feis makes the new and provocative argument that Grant's use of the Army of the Potomac's Bureau of Military Information played a significant role in Lee's defeat. Feis's work articulately rebuts accusations by Grant's detractors that his battlefield successes involved little more than the bludgeoning of an undermanned and outgunned opponent.
