附註:Includes bibliographical references (pages 380-403) and index.
Introduction -- Important terms, notation and classification of games -- Static games with discrete strategy space -- Finite dynamic games with discrete strategy space: a first approach -- Infinite dynamic games with discrete strategy space: a first approach -- Finite dynamic games with discrete strategy space: a second approach -- Infinite dynamic games with discrete strategy space: a second approach -- Issue linkage -- Static games with continuous strategy space: a global emission game -- Finite dynamic games with continuous strategy space and static representations of dynamic games -- Bargaining over a uniform emission reduction quota and a uniform emission tax -- Infinite dynamic games with continuous strategy space -- Coalition models: a first approach -- Coalition models: a second approach -- Coalition models: a third approach -- Summary and conclusions.
摘要:The book investigates various strategies to provide countries with an incentive to accede, agree and comply to an international environmental agreement (IEA). Finus shows that by integrating real world restrictions into a model, game theory is a powerful tool for explaining the divergence between "first-best" policy recommendations and "second-best" designs of actual IEAs. For instance he explains why (inefficient) uniform emission reduction quotas have played such a prominent role in past IEAs despite economists' recommendations for the use of (efficient) market-based instruments as for example emission targets and permits. Moreover, it is stated, that a single, global IEA on climate is not necessarily the best strategy and small coalitions may enjoy a higher stability and may achieve more.
