附註:Includes bibliographical references (pages 365-368) and index.
Introduction. The project ; A first-person approach ; Guarding against peremptory rejection ; A look ahead. -- First-person knowledge. Attitudes and experience ; Knowledge, belief, and warrant ; Why I am not a Cartesian ; The shape of the argument ; Knowing what one perceives ; A Wittgensteinian challenge ; Solitary self-knowledge ; But do we know our minds? -- Third-person doubts about first-person warrant. Third-person doubts ; Experimental assaults on "privileged access" ; Why third-person investigation will not banish first-person warrant ; Self-knowledge and the eliminativist prospect ; Lingering methodological anxieties. -- Phenomenal consciousness ; How to deny consciousness ; Summary.
Varieties of consciousness neglect. A test for neglect ; Seeming, judging, and discriminatory talents ; Learning visual judgment ; Inner discrimination, sensory qualities, and higher-order thought ; Consciously seeing is not just thinking you do ; The capacity to use visual information ; Evaluative talents ; Consciousness neglect in functionalism ; Is consciousness a hidden feature? ; Summary. -- Preventing neglect. Seeking rationales for neglect ; Does neuroscience say we are not conscious? ; Is Belinda a metaphysical mistake? ; The warrantability of missing-experience reports ; Fear of skepticism ; Summary. -- Consciousness and self-reflection. Consciousness and self-directedness ; Intentionality and mentally self-directed features ; The "consciousness-of" trap ; Unreflected-on experience ; Unreflective perceivers ; The absence of inner perception ; Summary.
Visual experience: intentionality and richness. Can we take the intentional out of the phenomenal? ; Framing the issue ; Is the phenomenal holistic enough to be intentional? ; Sense-data inflated (and exploded) ; Sensory intentionality is not bestowed by judgment ; Might essential environmental and behavioral links be missing? ; The intentionality of color experience ; Visual experience: untold riches ; Other forms of phenomenal visual wealth ; Summary. -- Conscious thought. Conscious thought -- iconic and noniconic ; Intentionality and visualization ; Consciousness thought: not just imagery ; The relation of phenomenal and intentional differences in thought ; Thought's seeming: inseparable from thought ; Conclusion. -- The importance of consciousness. Does consciousness matter? ; Experience for its own sake ; The importance of being conscious ; Should we care so much about consciousness? ; But must we talk about it? ; Conclusion.
摘要:Charles Siewert presents a distinctive approach to consciousness that emphasizes our first-person knowledge of experience and argues that we should grant consciousness, understood in this way, a central place in our conception of mind and intentionality. Written in an engaging manner that makes its recently controversial topic accessible to the thoughtful general reader, this book challenges theories that equate consciousness with a functional role or with the mere availability of sensory information to cognitive capacities.
