附註:Includes bibliographical references (pages 117-127) and index.
Cover; Copyright; Contents; Preface; 1. A prior ethical commitment; 2. Ends vs. means: consequentialsim vs. contractarianism; 3. The consequentialist approach to government; 4. Enter the economists; 5. The efficiency standard, corruption and the growth of government; 6. The indeterminancy of social welfare theory; 7. The contractarian approach to government; 8. The rules of the political game; 9. Playing by the generality rule; 10. Generality and minimalist government; References; Index.
摘要:This text aims to show that social welfare theory, as defended by welfare economists and policymakers, is based on a confused and untenable moral theory, is incompatible with a rights-based legal order and is bound to promote unjust and arbitary redistributions. By advocating a return to the Kantian conception of the moral agent, it aims to show the way to a normative economics that harmonizes with both intuitive morality and the American legal and constitutional tradition.
