附註:Includes bibliographical references (pages 311-316) and index.
Cover -- Table of Contents -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- Preface -- Acknowledgments -- On the authors -- 1. THE ESSENCE OF NEGOTIATION -- 1.1. Introduction -- 1.2. Real life negotiations: motivating examples -- 1.3. Outline of the book -- 2. A BARGAINING MODEL WITH THREATS -- 2.1. Introduction -- 2.2. The bargaining problem -- 2.3. A bargaining game with threats -- 2.4. Related Literature -- Part I Exogenous disagreement outcomes -- 3. THE ALTERNATING OFFERS PROCEDURE -- 3.1. Introduction -- 3.2. Alternating offers -- 3.3. Markov perfect equilibrium -- 3.4. Subgame perfect equilibrium -- 3.5. Applications -- 3.6. Related literature -- 4. THE NASH PROGRAM -- 4.1. Introduction -- 4.2. Nash's bargaining solution -- 4.3. Strategic bargaining and Nash's bargaining solution -- 4.4. The two approaches are complementary -- 4.5. Related Literature -- 5. COMPREHENSIVE BARGAINING PROBLEMS -- 5.1. Introduction -- 5.2. Comprehensive bargaining problems -- 5.3. Markov perfect equilibrium -- 5.4. Subgame perfect equilibrium -- 5.5. Nash program -- 5.6. Contract space -- 5.7. Related Literature -- 6. COMPARATIVE STATICS -- 6.1. Introduction -- 6.2. Utility functions and the contract space -- 6.3. Nonstationary bargaining problems -- 6.4. Alternative bargaining procedure -- 6.5. Related Literature -- Part II Endogenous Threats -- 7. COMMITMENT AND ENDOGENOUS THREATS -- 7.1. Introduction -- 7.2. Optimal threats with commitment -- 7.3. Credible threats without commitment -- 7.4. Numerical examples -- 7.5. Related literature -- 8. BARGAINING OVER WAGES -- 8.1. Introduction -- 8.2. A model of wage negotiations -- 8.3. Wage bargaining with efficient holdouts -- 8.4. Dutch wage bargaining: an application -- 8.5. Related literature -- 9. THE POLICY BARGAINING MODEL -- 9.1. Introduction -- 9.2. Subgame perfect equilibria -- 9.3. Policy Bargaining -- 9.4. Numerical Examples -- 9.5. Related literature -- 10. DESTRUCTIVE THREATS -- 10.1. Introduction -- 10.2. Difference games -- 1
摘要:The modern theory of threats in bargaining situations is presented in a unified and systematic treatment that puts the existing literature in a new perspective. Harold Houba and Wilko Bolt provide a masterful synthesis of the fundamental results obtained in the rapidly expanding game-theoretic literature. The relative impacts of the fundamental forces on the bargaining outcome are discussed and related to the visions expressed by Nobel-laureate John Nash. Many topics -such as robustness of the results with respect to the diversity of known bargaining procedures, the role of commitment and policy bargaining situations- receive their most extensive treatment to date. Credible Threats in Negotiations is suitable as a textbook for graduate students in economic theory and other social sciences and a necessity as a resource for scholars interested in bargaining situations.
