附註:Includes bibliographical references and indexes.
Chapter 1: Simulation theory and mental concepts -- Reply to Alvin I. Goldman -- Chapter 2: From simulation to theory -- Reply to Paul Bernier -- Chapter 3: Neurophysiological evidence for simulation of action -- Reply to Jean Decety. Perceiving actions and understanding agency -- Chapter 4: The scope and limits of mental simulation -- Reply to Pierre Jacob -- Chapter 5: Some reasons to link imitation and imitation recognition to theory of mind -- Reply to Jacqueline Nadel -- Chapter 6: Varieties of simulation -- Reply to François Recanati -- Chapter 7: Mental simulation, dialogical processing and the syndrome of autism -- Reply to Donald M. Peterson -- Chapter 8: Can "radical" simulation theories explain psychological concept acquisition? -- Reply to Joëlle Proust -- Chapter 9: Joint attention and simulation -- Reply to John Campbell.
摘要:The current debate between theory theory and simulation theory on the nature of mentalisation has reached no consensus yet, although many now think that some hybrid theory is needed. This collection of essays represents an effort at re-evaluating the scope of simulation theory, while also considering areas in which it could be submitted to experimental tests. The volume explores the two main versions of simulation theory, Goldman's introspectionism and Gordon's radical simulationism, and enquires whether they allow a non-circular account of mentalisation. The originality of the volume is to co.
