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Pricing and price regulation :an economic theory for public enterprises and public utilities

  • 作者: Bös, Dieter.
  • 出版: Amsterdam ;New York : Elsevier 1994.
  • 版本: 3rd completely rev. ed.
  • 稽核項: 1 online resource (xv, 453 pages) :illustrations.
  • 叢書名: Advanced textbooks in economics ;v. 34
  • 標題: BUSINESS & ECONOMICS Economics -- Microeconomics. , Services publics , Entreprises publiques , Entreprises publiques Prix. , Public utilities , Electronic books. , Fixation. , Prix Fixation. , Government business enterprises Prices. , Pricing. , Prix , Prices. , Prix. , Services publics Prix. , Public utilities Prices. , Government business enterprises , Price regulation. , EconomicsMicroeconomics. , BUSINESS & ECONOMICS
  • ISBN: 0080514707 , 9780080514703
  • 試查全文@TNUA:
  • 附註: Includes bibliographical references (pages 413-436) and indexes. Front Cover; Pricing and Price Regulation: An Economic Theory for Public Enterprises and Public Utilities; Copyright Page; Introduction to the Series; An Overview of the Contents of this Book; What is New in this Book?; Table of Contents; Chapter 1. Introduction; 1.1 Normative and Positive Theory; 1.2 The Institutional Setting; 1.3 Socialization of Commodities; 1.4 Nationalization of Enterprises; 1.5 Privatization in Market-Oriented Economies; 1.6 Privatization in Post-Communist Economies; Part One: The Basic Pricing Model; Chapter 2. Special Pricing Rules: Objectives and Constraints 2.1 Objectives I: Normative Theory2.2 Objectives II: Positive Theory; 2.3 Constraints I: Markets; 2.4 Constraints II: Production; 2.5 Constraints III: Profits and Deficits; Chapter 3. Normative Optimum Theory; 3.1 The Actors and Their Instruments; 3.2 Solving the Model; 3.3 The Conditions for Optimal Prices and Quantities; 3.4 Compensating for Income Effects; Chapter 4. Positive Optimum Theory; 4.1 Why Positive Theory?; 4.2 The Various Objectives; 4.3 The Marginal Conditions on Positive-Theory Prices; Chapter 5. Normative Piecemeal Theory 5.1 On the Difference Between Optimum and Piecemeal Policies5.2 Welfare Improvements with Non-Tight Constraints; 5.3 Welfare Improvements with Tight Technology Constraint; 5.4 On Welfare-Improving Increases of Public Inefficiency; 5.5 Piecemeal-Policy Recommendations: General Rules for Some Special Cases; Chapter 6. Positive Piecemeal Theory; 6.1 Improvements with Tight and Non-Tight Constraints; 6.2 The Trade-Off Between Efficiency and Market Equilibrium; Part Two: Normative Theory Pricing Policies for Welfare Maximization; A Basic Rules; Chapter 7. Marginal-Cost Pricing; 7.1 Optimum Policy 7.2 Consequences for Allocation, Distribution, and Stabilization7.3 Piecemeal Policy; Chapter 8. Ramsey Pricing; 8.1 Optimum Ramsey Policy; 8.2 Influence of Ramsey Prices on Allocation, Distribution, and Stabilization; 8.3 A Piecemeal-Policy Interpretation of the Ramsey Optimum; 9 Pricing with Distributional Aims; 9.1 Prices Versus Taxes; 9.2 Feldstein Pricing; 9.3 Comparing Distributional and Allocative Pricing; Chapter 10. Adjustment to Private Monopolistic Pricing; 10.1 The Second-Best Issue: Adjustment to, Versus Interference in, Private Monopolistic Pricing 10.2 Public Prices in an Imperfect Market EconomyB Intermediate Goods; Chapter 11. Optimal Pricing of Publicly Supplied Intermediate Goods; 11.1 Modifying the Basic Model; 11.2 Distributional or Allocative Pricing?; 11.3 Allocative Pricing; 11.4 Distributional Pricing; 11.5 The Double Response of Private Firms; C Adjustment to Rationed Markets; Chapter 12. Rationed Labor Market; 12.1 Individual Employment Constraints; 12.2 An Overall Employment Constraint; Chapter 13. Capacity Limits of Public Transportation; D Time-Dependent Pricing; Chapter 14. Pricing Through Time and Adjustment Clauses
  • 摘要: This clear, precisely written text presents an important branch of the modern, micro-economically based theory of industrial organization and of public finance, utilizing calculus only. Answers are provided to some pertinent economic questions, such as the pricing policies of vote-seeking politicians, of empire-building bureaucrats and of out-put-maximizing and energy-saving public utilities. These policies are compared with the welfare economic benchmark rules e.g. on marginal cost pricing and Ramsey pricing. Great significance is attached to price regulation. The book elucidates the recent r.
  • 電子資源: https://dbs.tnua.edu.tw/login?url=https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&AN=100826
  • 系統號: 005306012
  • 資料類型: 電子書
  • 讀者標籤: 需登入
  • 引用網址: 複製連結
This clear, precisely written text presents an important branch of the modern, micro-economically based theory of industrial organization and of public finance, utilizing calculus only. Answers are provided to some pertinent economic questions, such as the pricing policies of vote-seeking politicians, of empire-building bureaucrats and of out-put-maximizing and energy-saving public utilities. These policies are compared with the welfare economic benchmark rules e.g. on marginal cost pricing and Ramsey pricing. Great significance is attached to price regulation. The book elucidates the recent replacement of rate of return regulation by price-cap regulation. It also explains why many simple rules like yardstick regulation fail to achieve optimal prices, which shows how complicated it is to induce managers to truthfully reveal their private information. How this can be achieved properly is shown in various principal-agent models on regulation with uncertain costs, uncertain demand and with soft budget constraints.
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