附註:Includes bibliographical references and index.
Introduction / Carlo Carraro and Vito Fragnelli -- Part I. Climate negotiations and policy -- 1. Stable international agreements on transfrontier pollution with ratification constraints / Sergio Currarini and Henry Tulkens -- 2. Can equity enhance efficiency? : some lessons from climate negotiations / Francesco Bosello [and others] -- 3. Endogenous strategic issue linkage in international negotiations / Carlo Carraro and Carmen Marchiori -- 4. Kyoto and beyond Kyoto climate policy : comparison of open-loop and feedback game outcomes / Juan Carlos Císcar and Antonio Soria -- Part II. Sharing environmental costs -- 5. Cost sharing in a joint project / Stef Hendrikus Tijs and Rodica Branzei -- 6. A model for cooperative inter-municipal waste collection : cost evaluation toward fair cost allocation / Stefano Moretti -- 7. Co-insurance games and environmental pollution risk / Vito Fragnelli and Maria Erminia Marina -- 8. Environmental effects of consumption : an approach using DEA and cost sharing / Hans Keiding -- Part III. Environmental management and pollution control -- 9. Competition and cooperation in natural resources exploitation : an evolutionary game approach / Gian Italo Bischi, Fabio Lamantia and Lucia Sbragia -- 10. Greenhouse gases, quota exchange and oligopolistic competition / Sjur Didrik Flam and Odd Godal -- 11. A conjectural cooperative equilibrium for strategic form games / Sergio Currarini and Marco Marini.
摘要:Game theory can be used to deal with complex economic and policy problems. It is therefore natural to adopt game theory as one of the analytical instruments that can enhance our understanding of the interrelations between the economy and the environment and that can also provide practical suggestions for policy interventions.
