Legislative deferrals :statutory ambiguity, judicial power, and American democracy
- 作者: Lovell, George I.
- 出版: Cambridge, UK ;New York : Cambridge University Press 2003.
- 稽核項: 1 online resource (xxi, 290 pages).
- 標題: Politique et pouvoir judiciaire , Legislative power. , Pouvoir législatif , Pouvoir judiciaire , Separation of powers United States. , LAW Constitutional. , Séparation des pouvoirs , Political questions and judicial power United States. , Judge-made law United States. , Gewaltenteilung , Droit créé par le juge , Political questions and judicial power , Legislative power , Public. , Droit créé par le juge États-Unis. , Politique et pouvoir judiciaire États-Unis. , Separation of powers , Electronic books. , USA. , Judge-made law , Pouvoir judiciaire États-Unis. , Judge-made law. , Constitutional. , Separation of powers. , LAW Public. , Political questions and judicial power. , Pouvoir législatif États-Unis. , Séparation des pouvoirs États-Unis. , Legislative power United States. , United States. , LAW
- ISBN: 0521168708 , 9780521168700
- ISBN: 052182415X , 9780521824156
- 試查全文@TNUA:
- 附註: Includes bibliographical references (pages 270-278) and index. Rethinking judicial policy making in a separation of powers system -- False victories: labor, Congress, and the courts, 1898-1935 -- "As harmless as an infant": the Erdman Act in Congress and the courts -- Killing with kindness: legislative ambiguity, judicial policy making, and the Clayton Act -- The Norris-LaGuardia Act, for once: learning what to learn from the past -- Legislative deferrals and judicial policy making in the administrative state: a brief look at the Wagner Act.
- 摘要: "Why do unelected federal judges have so much power to make policy in the United States? Why were federal judges able to thwart apparent legislative victories won by labor organizations in the Lochner era? Most scholars who have addressed such questions assume that the answer lies in the judiciary's constitutionally guaranteed independence and thus worry that insulated judges threaten democracy when they stray from baseline positions chosen by legislators. This book argues for a fundamental shift in the way scholars think about judicial policymaking. Instead of simply seeing judges as rivals to legislators, scholars need to notice that legislators also empower judges to make policy as a means of escaping accountability. The first book-length study of legislative deference to the courts, Legislative Deferrals offers a dramatic reinterpretation of the history of twentieth-century labor law and shows how attention to legislative deferrals can help scholars to address vexing questions about the consequences of judicial power in a democracy."--Jacket.
- 電子資源: https://dbs.tnua.edu.tw/login?url=https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&AN=120580
- 系統號: 005313097
- 資料類型: 電子書
- 讀者標籤: 需登入
- 引用網址: 複製連結
United States judges are criticized for making law when they should be following the laws made by elected officials. This book argues that much of the blame for judicial policymaking lies with elected officials. Legislators sometimes deliberately allow judges to make policy decisions because they want to avoid blame for making difficult choices. To demonstrate the importance of legislative deference, this study reexamines dramatic confrontations between Congress and the Supreme Court over labor policy in the early twentieth century.
來源: Google Book
來源: Google Book
評分