附註:Includes bibliographical references (pages 501-506) and index.
1. Theoretical framework -- 2. Strategic-form analysis: theory -- 3. Strategic-form analysis: applications -- 4. Refinements of Nash equilibrium: theory -- 5. Refinements of Nash equilibrium: applications -- 6. Incomplete information: theory -- 7. Incomplete information: applications -- 8. Repeated interaction: theory -- 9. Repeated interaction: applications -- 10. Evolution and rationality -- 11. Learning to play -- 12. Social learning and equilibrium selection.
摘要:Fernando Vega-Redondo's self-contained account of the main contributions of modern game theory and its applications to economics starts with a detailed description of how to model strategic situations. The discussion proceeds by studying basic solution concepts and their main refinements; games played under incomplete information; and repeated games. For each of these theoretical developments, the text includes a companion set of applications that cover the most representative instances of game-theoretic analysis in economics (e.g., oligopolistic competition, public goods, coordination failures, bargaining, insurance markets, implementation theory, signaling and auctions).
