附註:Title from PDF title page (viewed 20 July, 2010).
Includes bibliographical references.
Editorial advisory board; Editor's introduction; Lauchlin Currie: a biographical sketch; Lauchlin Currie's memoirs Chapter II: The Harvard years[1]; Lauchlin Currie's memoirs Chapter III: The New Deal; PhD thesis: "Bank assets and banking theory", Harvard University, January 1931[1]; PhD thesis Chapter IX: Bank assets and the business cycle[1]; PhD thesis Chapter XII: Conclusion; 1934 letter to FDR; Interview with Lauchlin Currie on the Great Depression[1]; Desirable changes in the administration of the Federal Reserve System[1]; The relation of government to monetary control[1]
The objectives of the Banking Bill of 1935Federal income-increasing expenditures, 1932-1935[1]; Some monetary aspects of the excess reserves problem; Public spending as a means to recovery; Recent developments in international monetary relations[1]; Stabilization of purchasing power through the use of public credit[1]; Would a further expansion of money be "injurious"?; Proposals relating to the capital inflow problem; The decline in the Federal contribution to the growth in community expenditures; The economic distribution of demand deposits[1]
Speech at the Chicago Forum of the American Institute of BankingSome aspects of business and banking developments in 1936 and 1937; The 100 percent reserve plan; The White House, Washington, Memorandum for the President: Personal; The White House, Washington, Memorandum for the President; Money and savings: how definitions affect policies[1]; Organization for monetary policy formulation[1]; A new hypothesis on the demand for money: the "accounting" motive and banks' costs[1]
摘要:The Editor's introduction to this special issue reviews the contributions of Lauchlin Currie (1902-1993) to monetary theory and policy over the six decades of his professional career. This is followed by 27 of Currie's hitherto unpublished papers and memoranda. These include Currie's own memoirs of his work at Harvard, 1925-1934, when he was almost alone in blaming the Fed for its failure to prevent the Great Depression of 1929-1933; and of his work at the US Treasury and Fed, 1934-1939. During this latter period he drafted the 1935 Banking Act that shifted the power base of the monetary syste.
