資料來源: Google Book
In defense of a political court
- 作者: Peretti, Terri Jennings,
- 出版: Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press ©1999.
- 稽核項: 1 online resource (371 pages).
- 標題: Jurisprudence. , Electronic books. , Judicial review. , LAW Jurisprudence. , Constitutional. , Political questions and judicial power , LAW Public. , Political questions and judicial power. , Constitutional law. , Public. , LAW Constitutional. , Constitutional law , Judicial review United States. , United States. , Judicial review , Constitutional law United States. , LAW , Political questions and judicial power United States.
- ISBN: 0691009058 , 9780691009056
- ISBN: 0691009058 , 0691007187 , 9780691007182
- 試查全文@TNUA:
- 附註: Includes bibliographical references (pages 321-358) and index.
- 摘要: "Can the Supreme Court be free of politics? Do we want it to be? Normative constitutional theory has long concerned itself with the legitimate scope and limits of judicial review. Too often, theorists seek to resolve that issue by eliminating politics from constitutional decisionmaking. In contrast, Terri Peretti argues for an openly political role for the Supreme Court." "In Defense of a Political Court marshals considerable empirical evidence regarding the courts and American democracy to support its provocative normative argument. In so doing, it bridges the gap between normative constitutional theorists and political scientists who study the courts."--Jacket
- 電子資源: https://dbs.tnua.edu.tw/login?url=https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&AN=74719
- 系統號: 005322838
- 資料類型: 電子書
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- 引用網址: 複製連結
Can the Supreme Court be free of politics? Do we want it to be? Normative constitutional theory has long concerned itself with the legitimate scope and limits of judicial review. Too often, theorists seek to resolve that issue by eliminating politics from constitutional decisionmaking. In contrast, Terri Peretti argues for an openly political role for the Supreme Court. Peretti asserts that politically motivated constitutional decisionmaking is not only inevitable, it is legitimate and desirable as well. When Supreme Court justices decide in accordance with their ideological values, or consider the likely political reaction to the Court's decisions, a number of benefits result. The Court's performance of political representation and consensus-building functions is enhanced, and the effectiveness of political checks on the Court is increased. Thus, political motive in constitutional decisionmaking does not lead to judicial tyranny, as many claim, but goes far to prevent it. Using pluralist theory, Peretti further argues that a political Court possesses instrumental value in American democracy. As one of many diverse and redundant political institutions, the Court enhances both system stability and the quality of policymaking, particularly regarding the breadth of interests represented. In Defense of a Political Court marshals considerable empirical evidence regarding the courts and American democracy to support its provocative normative argument. In so doing, it bridges the gap between normative constitutional theorists and political scientists who study the courts.
來源: Google Book
來源: Google Book
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