附註:Includes bibliographical references (pages 161-167) and indexes.
Introduction -- A Second Perfection -- Freedom of action -- Freedom of will: the negative views -- Free will -- Free volitions -- The Elusive Something and Freedom of Will: The Positive Views -- The first edition -- The second and later editions -- Some consequences of the second edition account -- Freedom of will and the natural law theory -- Conclusion -- Volition and Voluntary Action -- Action and active powers -- Passion and proper action -- Active and passive power -- What are volitions? -- A quick look back -- Voluntary action -- The necessity of causation by volition for voluntariness -- The (non)sufficiency of causation by volition for voluntariness -- An alternative interpretation -- The power to act voluntarily -- The special attributability of voluntary action -- Conclusion -- Free Agency and Personal Identity -- Choice and personal identity -- Contemplation of (temporally) absent pleasure and pain -- Conclusion.
摘要:"This is the first comprehensive interpretation of John Locke's solution to one of philosophy's most enduring problems: free will and the nature of human agency. Many assume that Locke defines freedom as merely the dependency of conduct on our wills. And much contemporary philosophical literature on free agency regards freedom as a form of self-expression in action. Here, Gideon Yaffe shows us that Locke conceived free agency not just as the freedom to express oneself, but as including also the freedom to transcend oneself and act in accordance with "the good." For Locke, exercising liberty involves making choices guided by what is good, valuable, and important. Thus, Locke's view is part of a tradition that finds freedom in the imitation of God's agency. Locke's free agent is the ideal agent." "Yaffe also examines Locke's understanding of volition and voluntary action. For Locke, choices always involve self-consciousness. The kind of self-consciousness to which Locke appeals is intertwined with his conception of personal identity. And it is precisely this connection between the will and personal identity that reveals the special sense in which our voluntary actions can be attributed to us and the special sense in which we are active with respect to them. Deftly written and tightly focused, Liberty Worth the Name will find readers far beyond Locke studies and early modern British philosophy, including scholars interested in free will, action theory, and ethics."--Jacket
