The theory of learning in games

• 作者: Fudenberg, Drew.
• 其他作者: Levine, David K.
• 出版: Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press ©1998.
• 稽核項: 1 online resource (xiv, 276 pages) :illustrations.
• 叢書名: MIT Press series on economic learning and social evolution ;2
• 標題: MATHEMATICS , Electronic books. , MATHEMATICS Game Theory. , Game theory. , Game Theory.
• ISBN: 0262061945 , 9780262061940
• ISBN: 0262061945
• 試查全文@TNUA:
  
• 附註: Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Introduction -- 2. Fictitious Play -- 3. Replicator Dynamics and Related Deterministic Models of Evolution -- 4. Stochastic Fictitious Play and Mixed-Strategy Equilibria -- 5. Adjustment Models with Persistent Randomness -- 6. Extensive-Form Games and Self-confirming Equilibrium -- 7. Nash Equilibrium, Large Population Models, and Mutations in Extensive-Form Games -- 8. Sophisticated Learning.
• 摘要: In economics, most noncooperative game theory has focused on equilibrium in games, especially Nash equilibrium and its refinements. In The Theory of Learning in Games Drew Fudenberg and David Levine develop an alternative explanation that equilibrium arises as the long-run outcome of a process in which less than fully rational players grope for optimality over time. The models they explore provide a foundation for equilibrium theory and suggest useful ways for economists to evaluate and modify traditional equilibrium concepts.
• 電子資源: https://dbs.tnua.edu.tw/login?url=https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&AN=11353
• 系統號: 005284117
• 資料類型: 電子書
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• 引用網址: 複製連結
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